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LA NOTICIA QUE NO SE DIRÁ EN ESPAÑA:
Un informe del parlamento británico defiende que Escocia debería ser miembro de pleno derecho de la Unión Europea el mismo día que se hiciera efectiva su independencia, lo cual contradice la tesis de que todos estos días el gobierno español ha defendido: un veto de Europa a Catalunya en caso de que ésta declare la independencia.
El texto, elaborado por el director general honorario de la Comisión Europea y asesor del European Policy Centre, Graham Avery, asegura que "por razones prácticas y políticas" no se puede pedir a los escoceses que "marchen de la UE y después tengan que volver a hacer la petición para ser miembros".
El informe destaca que los escoceses tienen "derechos como ciudadanos europeos" porque han adquirido los derechos durante los últimos cuarenta años y que las negociaciones sobre el rol del nuevo estado escocés dentro de la UE deberían hacer "durante el período entre el referéndum y la fecha planificada para la independencia".
También dice que la independencia de Escocia requeriría un cambio de los tratados europeos "pero sólo para dar a Escocia representación en las instituciones de la UE (el número de miembros en el Parlamento Europeo, los votos en el Consejo de Ministros, etc). Según el informe, publicado en la página web del parlamento de Westminster, este cambio de tratado debería hacerse "simultáneamente a la independencia".
EL INFORME (clica en "Read more" para verlo entero):
HC 643 The foreign policy implications of and for a separate Scotland
Graham Avery,
Senior Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, Senior Adviser
at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, and Honorary Director-General
of the European Commission
1.
The object of this note is to
clarify the procedure by which, following a referendum in which the
Scottish people vote in favour of independence, Scotland could become a
member of the European Union. Although the note touches on wider issues
such as the terms of Scotland’s membership and the attitude of the EU
member states and institutions, it focuses on the question of the
procedure for Scotland’s accession.
2.
In the debate on Scottish
independence it is natural that opponents tend to exaggerate the
difficulties of EU membership, while proponents tend to minimise them.
This note tries to address the subject as objectively as possible. In
summary it argues that:
·
Arrangements for Scotland’s EU membership would need to be in place simultaneously with independence
·
Scotland’s 5 million people, having been members of the EU for 40 years; have acquired rights as European citizens
·
For practical and political reasons they could not be asked to leave the EU and apply for readmission
·
Negotiations on the terms of
membership would take place in the period between the referendum and the
planned date of independence
·
The EU would adopt a simplified
procedure for the negotiations, not the traditional procedure followed
for the accession of non-member countries
3.
The author a Senior Member of St.
Antony’s College, Oxford, Senior Adviser at the European Policy Centre,
Brussels, and Honorary Director-General of the European Commission. He
worked for 40 years as a senior official in Whitehall and Brussels, and
took part in successive negotiations for EU enlargement (see
biographical note at end).
4.
The EU has no historical precedent
for dealing with Scottish independence. The following cases are
relevant, but hardly constitute precedents:
·
Greenland joined the EU in 1973 as
part of Denmark. Later it obtained home rule and voted to leave the EU.
This led to a decision of the EU in 1989 removing Greenland from the
EU’s customs territory and legal framework.
·
In March 1990 the German Democratic
Republic elected a new government committed to reunification; in
October 1990, when it joined the German Federal Republic, its 16 million
people became members of the EU.
·
As a result of Czechoslovakia’s
‘velvet divorce’ the Czech Republic and Slovakia became independent
states in 1993. Slovakia applied for EU membership in 1995, the Czech
Republic in 1996, and they both became members in 2004.
5.
German reunification represents in
some ways the opposite of Scottish independence: it was enlargement
without accession, whereas Scottish independence would be accession
without enlargement. Nevertheless it is pertinent for the Scottish case
from the point of view of procedure. Under pressure of the date for
reunification, the EU adopted a simplified procedure for negotiation
under which the Commission explored with Bonn and Berlin the changes
needed in EU legislation, and its proposals were approved rapidly by the
Council of Ministers and European Parliament. No EU intergovernmental
conference was necessary because there was no modification of the EU
Treaties.
6.
However, for Scotland a
modification of the EU Treaties would be necessary, if only to provide
for Scottish representation in the EU institutions (number of members of
European Parliament, number of votes in Council of Ministers, etc.).
7.
At this point we need to consider
the timing and procedure for such Treaty changes. Scotland’s EU
membership would need to be in place simultaneously with Scottish
independence. For practical and political reasons the idea of Scotland
leaving the EU, and subsequently applying to join it, is not feasible.
From the practical point of view, it would require complicated temporary
arrangements for a new relationship between the EU (including the rest
of the UK) and Scotland (outside the EU) including the possibility of
controls at the frontier with England. Neither the EU (including the
rest of the UK.) nor Scotland would have an interest in creating such an
anomaly.
8.
From the political point of view,
Scotland has been in the EU for 40 years; and its people have acquired
rights as European citizens. If they wish to remain in the EU, they
could hardly be asked to leave and then reapply for membership in the
same way as the people of a non-member country such as Turkey. The point
can be illustrated by considering another example: if a break-up of
Belgium were agreed between Wallonia and Flanders, it is inconceivable
that other EU members would require 11 million people to leave the EU
and then reapply for membership.
9.
It follows that negotiations on the
terms of Scottish membership would take place in the period between the
referendum and the planned date of independence. We do not know at this
stage how long that period would be; complicated negotiations between
Edinburgh and London would have to take place; but we may guess that not
more than one or two years be needed.
10.
The main parties in negotiations
for Scottish accession to the EU would be the member states (28 members
after Croatia’s accession in 2013) and the Scottish government (as
constituted under pre-independence arrangements). It may be noted that
in this situation the government of Scotland - not yet an independent
state - could not in fact submit an application for EU membership under
Article 49 of the Treaty. But it could indicate its wish for Scotland to
remain in the EU, and this would lead to negotiations in an appropriate
framework to prepare the necessary modification of the Treaties.
Proposals would be submitted for approval to the EU institutions and the
Parliaments of 28 member states and of Scotland, and would come into
force on the date of Scottish independence.
11.
As in the case of German
reunification, the EU would adopt a simplified procedure under which the
Commission would be asked to conduct exploratory talks with Edinburgh,
London and other capitals, and submit proposals. Although an
intergovernmental conference would be needed, it would not be of the
kind that handles accession negotiations with non-member countries. A
protracted accession procedure of that type, with detailed scrutiny of
35 chapters of the EU’s acquis, would not be necessary in the case of Scotland, which has applied the EU’s policies and legislation for 40 years.
12.
Let us return to the question of
the changes in EU legislation necessary for Scottish membership. We need
to distinguish here between changes in the EU Treaties (primary
legislation) and changes in EU regulations, directives, decisions etc.
(secondary legislation). The changes in the basic Treaties for
institutional reasons should not be problematic: for Scotland they could
easily be calculated by reference to member states of comparable size
(Denmark, Finland & Slovakia have populations of 5-6 million). The
number of votes in the Council for the remainder of the United Kingdom
would not need to be adjusted (with 60 million it would still be
comparable to France & Italy) although its members of Parliament
might need to be reduced in number in order to respect the Parliament’s
limit of members.
13.
In accession negotiations with
non-member countries the EU has always strongly resisted other changes
or opt-outs from the basic Treaties; at this stage it remains to be seen
what might be requested by Scottish representatives concerning the euro
or the Schengen area of free movement of persons. Without embarking
here on a discussion of the implications for Scotland of these policies,
we may note that although new member states are required to accept them
in principle, they do not become members of the eurozone or Schengen
immediately on accession, and are not permitted to do so. Joining the
euro or Schengen depends on a series of criteria that are examined in
the years following accession.
14.
Let us turn now to the secondary
legislation. Although a large number of technical adaptations would be
needed in order for Scotland to implement EU law, the vast majority of
these would be uncontroversial since they would be based on the existing
situation. In respect of EU policies and legislation, Scotland’s
citizens have a legitimate expectation of the maintenance of the status quo
in terms of economic and social conditions. There should be no need,
for example, to re-negotiate Scotland’s application of European policies
in fields such as environment; transport, agriculture, etc.: it would
suffice to transpose mutatis mutandis the situation that
already exists for Scotland within the U.K. Since the rest of the U.K.
could be affected, that process would require discussion and
clarification with London, but it would have little interest for other
member states who would be content to consider the question of secondary
legislation on the basis of a report and proposals from the Commission.
15.
Here again, it remains to be seen
whether Scottish representatives would request changes in the
application of EU rules and policies, for example the fisheries policy
or payments into the EU budget. In general one would expect these
matters to be solved on a temporary basis by means of a roll-over mutatis mutandis
of existing arrangements for the U.K. until the relevant EU rules come
up for revision, for example the renegotiation of fishing quotas, or the
multi-annual budgetary framework. Such solutions would, in fact, be in
Scotland’s interest since it could expect to obtain a better deal as a
member state with a full voice and vote in the EU than in the
pre-independence period. However, the adaptation of the British
budgetary rebate could require difficult negotiations between Edinburgh
and London as well as with Brussels.
Biographical note
Graham Avery is Senior Member
of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, Senior Adviser at the
European Policy Centre, Brussels, and Honorary Director-General of the
European Commission. He has given evidence on a number of occasions to
Committees of the House of Commons and the House of Lords
In the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in London (1965-72) he headed the unit
responsible for negotiations for accession to the EC, and later (1976)
served as Private Secretary to two Ministers. In the European Commission
in Brussels (1973-2006) he worked in agricultural policy, foreign
affairs, and the cabinets of the President and other Commissioners, and
took part in successive negotiations that enlarged the EU to 27 members.
His last post was as Director for Strategy, Coordination and Analysis
in the Directorate General for External Relations
He has been Fellow at the
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Fellow at the
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University
Institute, Florence,
Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, and Secretary General of the Trans European Policy Studies Association
In the Queen’s New Year
Honours 2012 he was appointed Companion of the Order of St. Michael and
St. George (CMG) for services to European affairs.
24 September 2012
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